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Race and Selective Enforcement in
Public Housing
Jeffrey Fagan, Garth Davies, and Adam Carlis*

Drugs, crime, and public housing are closely linked in policy and politics, and their nexus
has animated several intensive drug enforcement programs targeted at public housing
residents. In New York City, police systematically conduct “vertical patrols” in public housing
buildings, making tens of thousands of Terry stops each year. During these patrols, both
uniformed and undercover officers systematically move through the buildings, temporarily
detaining and questioning residents and visitors, often at a low threshold of suspicion, and
usually alleging trespass to justify the stop. We use a case-control design to identify the effects
of living in one of New York City’s 330 public housing developments on the probability of
stop, frisk, and arrest from 2004–2011. We find that the incidence rate ratio for trespass stops
and arrests is more than two times greater in public housing than in the immediate surrounding neighborhoods. We decompose these effects using first differences models and
find that the difference in percent black and Hispanic populations in public housing
compared to the surrounding area predicts the disparity in trespass enforcement and
enforcement of other criminal law violations. The pattern of racially selective enforcement
suggests the potential for systemic violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition on
racial discrimination.

I. Introduction
Crime and public housing are closely linked in the popular and political imagination, and
have been so for nearly 50 years (Dunworth & Saiger 1994; Holzman 1996; Popkin 2000;
Fagan et al. 2006). This linkage has been tied to public housing’s racial and socioeconomic
composition (Schill 1993; Marcuse 1995), as well as to its association with drugs (Kotlowitz
1992). The resulting labeling of public housing has led to a set of law enforcement tactics
that place residents under a very close police gaze, justifies efforts to “contain” residents
within the boundaries of public housing sites, and legitimizes the close surveillance of
visitors and neighbors from the surrounding communities who venture into public housing’s perimeter.

*Address correspondence to Jeffrey Fagan, Isidor and Seville Sulzbacher Professor of Law, Columbia University Law
School, Columbia University, 435 W. 116th St., New York, NY 10027; email: jaf45@columbia.edu. Davies is Associate
Professor, School of Criminology, Simon Fraser University; Carlis is J.D. 2010, Columbia Law School.
The authors are grateful to the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. for negotiating access to detailed
event data on crime and enforcement and Resident Survey data from the New York City Housing Authority. All
opinions are those of the authors, as is the responsibility for any errors.
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Relying on theories of order maintenance and on “hot spots” policing of “high crime
areas” (Skogan & Frydl 2004; Weisburd & Braga 2006), police have adopted tactics that
expose public housing residents to warrantless searches of their homes (Venkatesh 2000;
Pratt v. Chicago Housing Authority 1994), banishment statutes (Virginia v. Hicks 2003; Beckett
& Herbert 2010), and unilateral evictions (Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority 1970;
White 1995). Public housing enforcement strategies in New York, home of the nation’s
largest public housing system, have been based on “stop and frisk” tactics that became the
staple of policing in the early 1990s (Spitzer 1999; Fagan & Davies 2000; Geller & Fagan
2010). In New York, with the nation’s largest public housing network, police have made
hundreds of thousands of Terry stops in and around public housing, resulting in more than
35,000 trespass arrests each year since 2006.
This article looks at one particular crime, trespass, and one particular police tactic,
the vertical patrol, to determine the role race and location play in enforcement. The article
proceeds in three sections. First, we review the history of efforts to control crime in public
housing, including the legal background and tactical details of the trespass enforcement
regime as practiced in New York. Next, we discuss the details and results of our empirical
test for disparate treatment of public housing residents and the racial components of the
trespass enforcement strategy. The evidence shows that the level of trespass enforcement in
public housing cannot be explained by its crime predicates or other social or economic
conditions. We find racial disparities in trespass enforcement that result in disparate
treatment of persons living in public housing based on the racial composition of the site,
particularly the black population in public housing, even after accounting for counterfactuals of crime, socioeconomic conditions, and the amount and intensity of policing. The
results contradict aspects of the political narrative and the core policing theories that are
offered as justifications for intensive trespass enforcement. We conclude with thoughts on
the social and emotional burdens of trespass enforcement that are borne by the residents
who are the intended beneficiaries of the project.

II. Background
A. Crime in Public Housing
Modern public housing in the United States began in the 1930s as a benevolent social
experiment to alleviate slum conditions and benefit the mostly (white) working-class populations in U.S. cities (Cavanaugh 2005). Public housing expanded after World War II and
most of the new public housing construction consisted of clusters of high-rise towers sited
in neighborhoods already in the midst of significant social and structural change (Schill
1993). Beginning in the 1950s, public housing became a source of social and political
conflict as white working-class families—many of whom benefited from the GI Bill and
access to the burgeoning (and effectively white-only) suburbs—were replaced by poor
nonwhites (Marcuse 1995). This coerced racial heterogeneity led to conflicts in a wide
range of social policy domains such as housing, education (school busing), and welfare
policy (Katz 1989; Massey & Denton 1993; Perlstein 2008).
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As the white population in public housing continued to decline, the aging buildings
began to look more and more like reservations for the city’s poorest residents of color. The
racial threat of concentrated minority populations in public housing signaled “danger” for
older, declining white populations in public housing and in the surrounding neighborhoods. By 1970, public housing had become known, somewhat ominously and unfairly, as
“government ghettos” (Smith 1970).
The popular and political image of public housing hardened further as crime rates
rose in lockstep with cascading drug epidemics. A heroin epidemic began in New York and
other large metropolitan areas in the mid-1960s and continued into the early 1970s (Des
Jarlais & Uppal 1980). Crime rose concurrently as homicides tripled from 1967–1973,
stabilized, and then rose again from 1977–1981 (Roth 2009). Public housing was identified
in these eras as a central location in the distribution of drugs to persons living in the
surrounding communities (Curtis 2003).
Riots in minority neighborhoods in 47 U.S. cities in 1967–1968 reinforced both the
threat of crime and racialized (however inaccurately) its narrative (Kerner Commission
1968). In the 1970s, that perception was fortified by rare but widely publicized episodes of
youth violence (Time Magazine 1977), sequential drug epidemics, and elevated rates of
drug-related violence (Chaiken & Chaiken 1990). With the onset of the crack epidemic in
the mid-1980s, the high-rise towers of large, mostly black-occupied, public housing projects
again came to symbolize drug and crime problems (Austen 2012).
These connections are routinely revisited in the press, which has provided near
constant reminders of the persistence of drug problems in public housing. As Schill (1993)
explained: “Scarcely a day goes by without reports in the media about the . . . problems that
plague some publicly-owned housing developments. Accounts of appalling apartment conditions, corrupt administrators, and innocent bystanders killed by gang warfare are commonplace. Negative images of public housing have even found their way into popular
culture.” This perception is reinforced by academic and media portrayals and leads to a
situation where outsiders—those not intimately familiar with the neighborhoods—perceive
public housing as more dangerous than the facts can substantiate (Quillian & Pager 2001;
Sampson & Raudenbush 2004; Carlis 2009). The perception of public housing and its
residents as the focal point of criminality in a neighborhood has justified, as Lazarus (2004)
put it, “the use of every conceivable tool . . . to combat the ever-present criminal element
in . . . housing projects.”
B. Law and Social Control in Public Housing
Beginning with the heroin epidemic in the 1960s, drug law and policy began to specifically target public housing. Agar and Reisinger (2002) explain that while heroin initially
received little mainstream attention, public scrutiny came toward the end of the decade
“when, due to fear of urban crime and heroin use among American military personnel in
Vietnam, it became defined as a threat.” The conversation focused on public housing
when dealers set up shop in “large apartment buildings . . . where landlords were not
often present” (Curtis 2003). According to Curtis (2003) and other ethnographers of the
crack epidemic (e.g., Hamid 1990; Johnson et al. 1990), drug dealers attempting to avoid
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street sweeps by New York Police Department (NYPD) officers during the crack epidemic
of the 1980s and 1990s would later mimic this move to indoor drug sales. Evicting public
housing tenants who participated in or supported drug dealing was a logical response
(White 1995).
In New York, those evictions resulted in a protracted legal battle to determine what
rights tenants had in their state-provided housing and under what conditions they could be
evicted. The courts initially came to the tenants’ defense and enforced a consent decree
mandating that the housing authority adhere to certain procedural safeguards before
terminating a tenant’s lease, including detailed notice of charges and a full evidentiary
hearing with a right to cross-examine hostile witnesses (White 1995). The housing authority
and law enforcement institutions, viewing the decree as an unnecessary and inappropriate
barrier that constrained police and protected wrongdoers from the consequences of their
actions, sought to undermine it in the courts. They finally succeeded in 1996, when a New
York district court concluded that the crack epidemic constituted “a quantum leap in the
drug problem” that caused a “dramatic increase in the amount of crime and violence in the
public housing developments throughout the city” and justified modifying the consent
decree to facilitate the eviction of undesirable tenants (Escalera v. NYCHA 1996). Put
another way, fighting the drug war justified tactics that just a few years earlier very well
might have violated the Constitution.
That decision was mimicked nationwide when, in 1996, President Clinton announced
the “One Strike” policy to encourage public housing authorities to speed the eviction of
residents involved in criminal activity (Hellegers 1999). The Supreme Court sanctioned
such evictions in HUD v. Rucker (2002), a case involving the eviction of a 63-year-old
grandmother and her family based on the drug arrest of her mentally disabled granddaughter several blocks away from public housing grounds.
With both political and legal backing, policing followed suit. Enforcement strategies
included order maintenance policing (OMP) (Livingston 1997; Spitzer 1999; Skogan &
Frydl 2004) that relied on “high crime area” jurisprudence (Ferguson & Bernache 2008)
to justify the targeting of public housing with special tactics such as vertical patrols. For its
part, New York adopted a form of OMP based on Wilson and Kelling’s (1982) “broken
windows” theory. That theory argues that visible signs of disorder tell potential wrongdoers that the neighborhood tolerates misdeeds, thereby encouraging further transgressions.
It suggests that law enforcement should “focus on quality of life crimes, eliminating visible
signs of disorder before they spiral into something worse” (Levy 2008; Geller & Fagan
2010). The visible social disorder of crime and drugs in public housing was exactly the
type of crime manifestation that served both the theory and justifying ideology of broken
windows (Harcourt 1998; Kelling & Coles 1996). Adapting broken windows theory to
indoor, apartment-based drug dealing suggested that the arrest of persons loitering in the
hallways or stairwells could disrupt the indoor retail trade (Boland 1998). Using trespass
law to eliminate those loiterers would (according to broken windows theory) eliminate
visible lawlessness and therefore reduce the more serious crimes taking place in the
building.
As with its strategic and policy predecessors, trespass enforcement in public
housing was animated by the empirical and theoretical connection between drug selling
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and crime, but the modern version is a significant strategic departure from past public
housing interventions to eliminate drug use and disrupt drug markets. Those efforts
focused on evictions of tenants who were implicated in the drug business, as well as
undercover drug buys in and around public housing to disrupt drug-selling enterprises.
Trespass enforcement was something new: a larger-scale effort that was “wholesale” both
in its scope and in the fact that it was implemented as a preemptive engagement with
would-be offenders. Anyone in public housing, whether associated with the drug trade or
not, is now subject to being stopped, frisked, and possibly arrested in the name of public
order.
The trespass arrests resulting from this strategy take on additional normative and
constitutional importance in light of the limited efficacy of OMP in preventing more
serious crime (Harcourt & Ludwig 2006; Rosenfeld et al. 2007; Chauhan et al. 2011),
the observed racial disparities in its implementation (Fagan & Davies 2000; Gelman et al.
2007; Fagan et al. 2010), and the constitutional concerns that have surrounded the policy
(Carlis 2009).
That said, targeting trespass, rather than funneling resources toward direct enforcement of the drug laws, provides the police with a tactical benefit. Because probable cause
is required to make an arrest, targeting street-level drug dealers usually involves undercover buy-and-bust operations, an expensive, dangerous, and time-consuming tactic. On
the other hand, targeting trespassers eliminates the need for police officers to actually
witness a drug crime. Instead, police officers can rely on the public-housing-specific trespass law, and the suspect’s presence in the building, to make their initial approach. They
are therefore able to question more people with less evidence. And, while overinclusive,
these systematic stops do sometimes lead to the arrest of individuals for drug-related
activity.
C. The Practice of Vertical Patrols
In 1992, New York amended its trespass statute to criminalize entering or remaining in
public housing without permission (Carlis 2009). The enforcement of that statute bears a
striking resemblance to the vague and overbroad loitering, vagrancy, and disorderly
conduct laws used to isolate and control the movement of nonwhites during the mid-1900s
(Livingston 1997). Those statutes enabled “the police [to] seize just about anyone on the
street” because they could be “applied to almost any public behavior” (Stuntz 1995). A
dangerous confluence of unbridled police discretion and widespread racism developed,
eventually leading to the invalidation of many of these statutes (Stuntz 1995). However, as
Rosenthal (2000) points out, even some of the conventional, modern criminal statutes
“allow . . . the police enormous freedom to undertake a variety of quite heavy-handed
measures against the residents of inner-city minority communities.” Some, like a Chicago
anti-loitering ordinance, were struck down by the courts; others, like the public-housingspecific trespass law in New York, remain on the books.
The police tactic most frequently associated with trespass enforcement in urban
high-rises in general, and in public housing in particular, is the vertical patrol, which the
New York State Fraternal Order of Police (2010) describes “as a process by which a Police
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Officer systematically and methodically checks each building one at a time, covering roof
landings, stairwells and lobbies.” Before the 1992 amendment to New York’s trespass
statute, nonresidents were permitted to occupy the public areas of these buildings. Now,
even during the most routine vertical patrol stop, police officers can quickly develop
probable cause for a trespass arrest. Under People v. De Bour (1976), the leading New York
Court of Appeals case on state stop and frisk law, a police officer need only have “some
articulable reason” to ask “basic, nonthreatening questions.” This low bar for what has been
termed a “Level 1 inquiry” prevents only those inquiries “undertaken with intent to harass
or . . . based upon mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity.” In People v. Hollman (1992), the
New York Court of Appeals explained that inquiries “regarding . . . identity, address or
destination” typically constitute Level 1 inquiries. As a result, current New York jurisprudence places almost no barriers between the police officer and a trespass arrest (Carlis
2009). Once the initial inquiry begins, a nonresident will quickly have to divulge his or her
nonresidency and, absent some evidence that he or she is a lawfully present guest, that
information alone justifies arrest. Many residents also face the same scrutiny, resulting in
arrests of citizens entering or exiting their own homes (Davis v. City of New York 2012).
D. Race and Trespass Enforcement
Public housing in New York is dramatically segregated. In 2008, 91 percent of public
housing residents were African American or Latino, and only 4.3 percent were white (New
York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) 2009). When it comes to those residents most
affected by vertical patrols and trespass stops, these numbers are even more dramatic. The
white population contains a disproportionately high number of individuals over the age of
62 (NYCHA 2009). Senior citizens would seem both less likely to be targeted during a
vertical patrol and less likely to be in the common areas of the building for an extended
period of time. As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted in Davis v. NYCHA (2002),
white residents are not uniformly distributed across all NYCHA buildings. Instead, they
tend to be clustered in the more desirable buildings. Because vertical patrols are also not
conducted uniformly across all NYCHA buildings, but targeted at those buildings where the
police believe they will be most effective (New York City Police Department 2005), it is likely
that many white residents escape the brunt of vertical patrol activity.
The demography of public housing makes racial disparity in the tactic’s implementation inevitable, regardless of legal or policy justifications, but the tactic itself continues
in part because of a racially charged perception of public housing. As Smith (1986)
has found, “the likelihood of arrest and coercive action by police toward suspects appears
to vary with certain dimensions of neighborhoods,” namely, the “socioeconomic status
of the community” and the “racial composition of neighborhoods.” Public housing’s
concentration of poor people of color therefore makes it a prime target for intensive
enforcement (Terrill & Reisig 2003; Kochel et al. 2011). Clarke (2009) has found an
increase in incidents of police misconduct related to police stops and frisks, much as
Smith (1986) would predict.
Moreover, Werthman and Piliavin (1967) concluded that “residence in a neighborhood
is the most general indicator used by police to select a sample of potential law violators.”
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Kochel et al. (2011) show robust evidence of the effects of race and neighborhood context
on police decisions to make arrests relative to any racial differences in offending rates.
Smith (1986) explained that these selection processes will often result in a “process of
ecological contamination in which all persons encountered in bad neighborhoods are
viewed by police as possessing the moral liability of the area itself.” Because of this “ecological contamination,” adherents to broken windows theory are likely to view anyone in the
common areas of public housing to be a visible sign of disorder, regardless of whether they
are acting unlawfully. It is unsurprising, then, that systematic stops are the tactic of choice
in public housing.
But just as the metrics for moving from perception of disorder to categorization of
a place as disorderly are subjective and relativistic, sociologists and social psychologists
have shown that perceptions of disorder are influenced by both the racial makeup of
the community being observed and by the characteristics of the observer (Sampson &
Raudenbush 2004). Indeed, Sampson and Raudenbush (2004) explained that “Americans hold persistent beliefs linking blacks and disadvantaged minority groups to many
social images, including but not limited to crime, violence, disorder, welfare, and undesirability as neighbors.” As a result, when viewing public housing, police and politicians
may be prone to attributions of a higher level of disorder simply because the majority of
residents are people of color (Quillian & Pager 2001; Sampson & Raudenbush 2004;
Carlis 2009).
Of course, a legal challenge to vertical patrols under the equal protection clause
would require direct proof that trespass enforcement in public housing was race dependent
and purposeful. The police could argue, perhaps persuasively, that the higher crime rates
in public housing, and other nonracial factors that are correlates of crime and disorder,
motivated the higher rate of sweeps. Even if the inferences by police about race and crime
rates of public housing residents were made plain, the state’s interest in crime control may
void a claim of intentional discrimination based on race. An equal protection claim would
therefore have to squarely face the questions of crime and disorder that are the rationale
for the allocation of vertical patrols. If trespass enforcement is indexed to crime, we should
observe variation from one place to the next that is predicted by its crime rate, net of other
nonracial factors that are correlated with crime.
In this case, the search for drugs and weapons are the two compelling policy justifications articulated by the NYPD (Bratton & Knobler 1998; Spitzer 1999; Maple & Mitchell
2000; Fagan et al. 2010), and indexing trespass enforcement to rates of drugs or other
crime in public housing would provide a relevant benchmark against which to assess the
distribution of police enforcement and the attendant burdens of police suspicion and
interdiction. This is the test we conduct to determine if, in fact, the targeting of public
housing in New York for trespass enforcement masks an underlying racial targeting, or
excess of enforcement, that cannot be explained by crime rates alone. We consider two
faces of trespass enforcement: trespass stops, pursuant to the ongoing tactics of stop,
question, and frisk, and trespass arrests. We enhance the test by simulating public housing
conditions through controls for one-off similarities to compare public housing with its
immediate environs, and testing to see if the excess in enforcement above and beyond a
“signal” of race-crime patterns can be identified.
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III. Data and Methods
A. Empirical Strategy
We conduct a disparate treatment analysis to determine, first, if public housing in New York
is in fact targeted for trespass enforcement. Next, we assess whether the targeting of public
housing for trespass enforcement masks an underlying racial targeting, or an excess of
enforcement that cannot be explained by crime rates alone. We consider two faces of
trespass enforcement: trespass stops in public housing, pursuant to the ongoing tactics
of stop, question, and frisk (Fagan et al. 2010), and trespass arrests. The empirical strategy
compares trespass and other enforcement activities in NYCHA’s developments with the
same parameters of enforcement in similarly situated areas that share many of the social,
ecological, physical, and crime characteristics with the NYCHA developments but are not
part of NYCHA housing services.
The comparison group is the area immediately surrounding each NYCHA site. This
choice was motivated by two considerations. First, NYCHA sites are administratively drawn
boundaries and NYPD enforcement is administered according to those boundaries. This
means that an empirically derived “nearest-neighbor” model that estimates contiguity or
shared spaces among (stop or crime) events (Levine 2006; Rogerson & Sun 2001; Paulsen
& Robinson 2004) would most likely identify another building within the same public
housing site comparisons. Accordingly, identifying a control group required a priori decisions about valid comparators within the framework of quasi-experimental design, rather
than relying solely on statistically derived comparators.
Second, NYCHA sites are not randomly distributed across the city (Fagan et al. 2006;
Marcusse 1995). Rather, they are more often concentrated in the city’s poorer neighborhoods (Umbach 2011). The adjacent neighborhood strategy produced a set of comparators
for NYCHA developments that were similar in most respects to NYCHA sites other than their
NYCHA status and the unique enforcement strategies in those sites. The neighboring and
contiguous (non-NYCHA) border areas allow us to do just that by taking into account the
general crime and social conditions in the larger yet immediate neighborhood context.
The contiguous area (nearest-neighbor) strategy thus allows us to better statistically identify
the unique effects of NYCHA status on patterns of enforcement. The reliance on vertical
patrol as a city-wide policing tactic also ensured that these places would be subject to the
same policing regime as the NYCHA sites (Carlis 2009).
To identify the surrounding areas, a perimeter was drawn around each NYCHA site
using geographical mapping software to identify the Census block groups that touched
on the borders of each of the NYCHA developments. Block group boundaries from the
2000 Census were used, given the 2004–2011 timeframe for the analysis. Figure 1 illustrates one of these spatial clusters that surround a NYCHA site. Enforcement activity
in the surrounding areas was compiled by summing all activity in the census block groups
surrounding the NYCHA site and computing rates per crime and per capita. The socioeconomic and demographic characteristics for the surrounding areas were the weighted
average of the component block groups. Public housing and surrounding areas were
identified by a dichotomous variable coded 1 for a NYCHA site and 0 for a surrounding
area.

Race and Selective Enforcement in Public Housing

Figure 1:
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Illustration of NYCHA site and surrounding neighborhood.

B. Data
1. Enforcement and Crime
We used two measures of enforcement: stops and arrests. In addition to total stops and total
arrests, each of the measures was further divided into three subtypes: trespass, weapons, and
drugs. We also combined stops and arrests to create overall enforcement measures. In sum,
this produced 12 dependent variables. An index of all the variables used in this study, along
with definitions and table references, is provided in the Appendix.
Counts and locations of stops and arrests were obtained from databases maintained
by the NYPD. For stops, the NYPD records information on a form known as the UF-250 each
time a citizen is stopped by the police, according to procedures set forth in the NYPD Patrol
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Guide (2009). Geocoded records of stops from 2004–2011 are publicly available from the
NYPD.1 The stop records include information regarding the suspect’s demographic and
physical characteristics, the location and time of day of the stop, and a free-response section
where officers indicate the suspected offense that generated the stop. Although officers may
use any number of phrases to describe stops based on suspicion of trespass, we use a few key
and recurring terms to identify these “trespass” stops.2 We use similar procedures to identify
stops for suspicion of carrying a concealed weapon (e.g., “CPW” for criminal possession of
a weapon), and other suspected crimes, including drug offenses, violent crimes, and
“quality-of-life” offenses. Using boundary maps provided by the New York City Department
of City Planning, we located each stop either at a public housing site, in its immediately
surrounding area, or elsewhere in the police precinct or borough.
Arrests were recorded in a similar fashion. Records of each arrest were obtained by
one of the authors from the NYPD pursuant to litigation in Floyd v. City of New York.3 These
records identify the suspect’s race and alleged offense, as well as the location of the arrest
and the crime. Geocoding procedures identical to those used for stops were used to locate
the arrests at a geographic space.
In this study, crime was measured by reported crime complaints. Similar to stops and
arrest, crime was disaggregated into four categories: total, violent, weapons, and drugs. Data
on reported crimes also were obtained from the NYPD as part of the Floyd litigation. Similar
geocoding procedures were used to locate crimes in each of the spatial units. Crime
complaints were aggregated for each month within each crime category for the NYCHA
sites, the surrounding areas, or elsewhere in the surrounding police precinct. In the
negative binominal models (see section entitled “Model Specification”), the natural logarithm of the crime variables is entered as an exposure variable (lagged by one month). We
refer to these exposure variables as crime rates.
2. Policing
We used two measures of policing, vertical patrols and patrol strength, to estimate the
extent to which variation in enforcement outcomes—stops and arrests—were a function of
the differentials in police interventions between public housing and the surrounding areas.
Each measure served as an estimate of the differential likelihood of encountering the
police.
As noted above, vertical patrols involve systematic building checks by the police. The
variable “vertical patrols” is a count of the number of these checks. Data on vertical patrols

1
Available
shtml>.

at

<http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/analysis_and_planning/stop_question_and_frisk_report.

2

Stops are identified as trespass stops from the “crimsusp” (i.e., “crime suspected”) field. A 30-character string,
crimsusp is entered by the officers at the time of a stop, and can take on virtually any value, including typographical
errors. Variations on the spelling of the word trespass, or variations in the designation of the trespass statute under
NYPL §§ 140.05, 140.10, 140.15, or 140.17, were recoded as trespass stops or abbreviations with the obvious connotation of trespass.

3

Floyd v. City of N.Y., U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, No. 08 Civ. 1034 (SDNY).
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by month and location were obtained from the city. The data included the date, time, and
location of the vertical patrol. Vertical patrols were then geocoded to x-y coordinates and
assigned to census block groups and in turn to the relevant spatial units of analysis. This
differential exposure of citizens to police may result in differential enforcement patterns
across racial/ethnic groups, especially under conditions where there are differences in the
racial makeup and concentrations of neighborhoods.
We also estimated the number of police officers who were on patrol in NYCHA sites
and in the surrounding areas. The patrol strength for each spatial unit of analysis (based on
block groups, as described above) was computed from the number of officers who made
one or more stops each month in each spatial unit (i.e., NYCHA site or surrounding area).
These data were computed by aggregating individual stops made by each officer, using the
officer’s unique identifier in the stop and frisk databases, to obtain a count of the number
of officers making stops in that area in that time unit.

3. Social and Economic Conditions
Data on social and economic conditions were recorded separately for public housing sites
and the areas adjacent neighborhoods.
The population characteristics of public housing sites were drawn from the NYCHA
Resident Data Handbooks for 2004–20011. These records are based on annual tenant surveys
that NYCHA conducts as part of its residency certification process. One limitation of these
data is the incentive of NYCHA residents to underreport occupancy, and also to discount
income totals and other economic indicators.
The critical measures for this analysis are population and age and race distributions.
Nonreporting of unrelated adults in the household is far more likely than withholding
information on unrelated children. Accordingly, population estimates and age distributions may have errors whose parameters are difficult to estimate. We doubt that there is
distortion by race, given the very low rates of mixed-race households in the survey data.
There is no ex ante reason to assume that nonreported adults or children would be from
different racial or ethnic groups than the official residents. From the tenant survey data, we
extracted measures of racial composition, percent minors (below 18), household size,
per-capita income, and total population.
To reduce multicollinearity, we combined the measures of race, minors, income, and
household size using principal components analysis (PCA). A one-factor solution was
specified and obtained, with eigenvalues in excess of 2.5. Separate factor scores were
constructed for each NYCHA site and surrounding area. The resulting factor scores,
referred to as the SES factor, were included as a covariate in the estimates, together with
population (logged) and crime conditions (lagged and logged).4

4

We considered, even attempted, to construct propensity scores for these conditions to simulate experimental
conditions for the comparison (Rubin 1997; Bang & Robins 2005; Freedman & Berk 2008; Indurkhya et al. 2010).
But we observed the same problem of multicollinearity, and as a result there was no variation in the computed
propensity score.
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C. Model Specification
The analysis proceeds in two stages. First, we test for evidence of disparate treatment of
public housing residents using a model that takes the form:

Outcome = α + β 0* + β1*NYCHA + β 2*Minority + β 3*Policing +
Σiβ i* (Plausible Nonrace Influences ) + ε ,
where Outcome is the stop or arrest rates, Minority is an indicator for the racial composition
or status of the unit observed (i.e., precinct or person, depending on the outcome), Policing
are the two measures of police activity in each place, Plausible Nonrace Influences are a set of
variables representing nonrace factors that also might influence the outcome, and e is an
error term that captures the variation in the outcome that cannot be explained by either
minority status or the nonrace influences. These models may include nonrace influences
that are correlated with race, so as to better identify the unique effects of race that are
present once the influence of proxies for race are removed (Campbell 1984; Greiner 2008).
We begin with a basic regression model for counts of events:

ln (λ ) = ∑ k = 0 βk x k .
K

(1)

In this equation, the natural logarithm of the expected number of events, ln(l), is
related to a vector of explanatory variables, xk, and their associated regression coefficients,
bk (b0 is a constant multiplied by 1 for each case). With count data, the probability of the
observed outcome, y, is often assumed to follow a Poisson distribution:

Pr (Y = y | λ ) =

e −λ λ y
.
y!

(2)

However, the Poisson distribution requires that the residual variance be equal to the
fitted values, l. This is unlikely to be true with events such stops or arrests, which cannot be
assumed to meet the Poisson assumption of independence among individual events.
Instead, the dependence of events will typically produce overdispersion, where residual
variances are greater than l. A common method of addressing potential overdispersion is
to specify that the probability of the observed outcome, y, follows a negative binomial
distribution:

Γ ( y + α −1 ) ⎡ α −1 ⎤
Pr (Y = y | λ , α ) =
y ! Γ (α −1 ) ⎢⎣ α −1 + λ ⎥⎦

α −1

y
⎡ λ ⎤,
⎣⎢ α −1 + λ ⎦⎥

(3)

where G is the gamma function, l is the mean or expected value of the distribution, and a
is the overdispersion parameter.
We address the variability in the size of public housing developments by analyzing
rates instead of counts. We do this through the use of an exposure variable. We modify
Equation (1) by adding a denominator, n:
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K

ln

k k

k =1

(4)

Osgood (2000) notes that algebraic manipulation produces the following regression
equation:
K

ln (λ ) = ln (n ) + ∑ βk x k .
k =0

(5)

The exposure variable, ln(n), is assigned a fixed coefficient of 1, and the negative
binomial regression is transformed into an analysis of rates (Osgood 2000). In many cases,
the natural logarithm of the population is used as the exposure variable. However, general
population is not an adequate denominator for this study (Brantingham & Brantingham
1998). The “risk” of being stopped or arrested in public housing (or its surrounding
neighborhoods) is not confined only to residents; rather, people visiting or merely passing
through these areas also are subject to police intervention. Instead of using population, we
use crime rates (logged crime complaints) as our measure of exposure, since it is crime that
informs the allocation of policing resources in various areas of the city (Fagan et al. 2010;
Geller & Fagan 2010). Tables 2–5 each control for a different crime rate: weapons, drugs,
violent, and total.
We use bootstrapped standard errors, which offer several advantages over either
robust, clustered, or other forms of standard error computation under these conditions
when distributions vary across observation units (Guan 2003; Efron & Tibshirani 1986;
Nevitt & Hancock 2001). The traditional approach to statistical inference requires strong
assumptions about the distributions of both of the predictors and the outcome variables,
especially assumptions about the normality of the distributions. The bootstrap method
calculates a distribution-free sampling distribution from just one sample through iterative
resampling of the original sample. Accordingly, bootstrapping has several advantages over
standard inferential techniques, especially its nonparametric assumptions and the capacity
to rule out the undue influence or leverage of anomalous cases within a sample. The larger
the number of bootstraps, the more accurate is the estimate of the standard error. In this
design, 10 iterations are used to estimate the standard errors.
Finally, we include fixed effects for each month in the time series. Part of the policing
regime in New York is the constant updating of crime information so that enforcement
strength and tactics can be adjusted in “real time” to meet sudden changes and new
patterns (Bratton & Knobler 1998; Maple & Mitchell 2000).
To estimate the racial component of trespass enforcement, we decompose the
observed differences between public housing and the surrounding areas by estimating a
series of difference-in-difference models, or DD, models (Abadie 2005; Athey & Imbens
2006; Cohen & Ludwig 2003; Card & Krueger, 1994). DD models are commonly used to
organize data to mimic experimental designs under conditions when randomization is
unavailable. Here, we estimate a linear mixed model regression to determine whether the
differences in any of the trespass measures are predicted by differences between public
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housing sites and their surrounding areas in the crime or socioeconomic conditions. First,
we assume:

Yit = β0 + β1S it + β2Policing + β3Raceit + β4 X it + ε ,
where:
Yit = the difference in trespass arrests (or stops or totals) in site i and month t between
public housing sites and the surrounding neighborhoods;
b1 estimates the effects of the difference in crime conditions (drug crimes and weapon
crimes) between public housing and the surrounding area lagged by one month;
b2 estimates the effects of differences in policing measures (vertical patrols and patrol
strength);
b3 estimates the difference in racial composition of the two areas, including black,
Hispanic, and other population groups; and
b4 estimates the difference in a vector of demographic variables between public housing
and the surrounding area (percent minors, household size, income per capita, and total
population).
The estimates of differences by race use linear regressions on first differences using
random effects models with robust standard errors and fixed effects for months.

IV. Results
A. Public Housing in New York City
NYCHA is the nation’s largest public housing authority, with an official population of over
600,000 residents in 179,000 units in 344 public housing developments (NYCHA 2011).
Most public housing developments are large: one in three has more than 1,000 units, and
less than one in 10 has fewer than 100 units. Most (65 percent) of the NYCHA developments were built before 1970, though most of the smaller ones were built after 1970
(Marcusse 1995).
Public housing is not randomly distributed across the five boroughs of New York City,
nor is it randomly sited in the city’s neighborhoods (Fagan & Davies 1999). Figure 2 shows
that over 85 percent of all public housing is in three boroughs: Brooklyn, Manhattan, and
the Bronx (Saegert et al. 1998), and most often in the city’s poorest neighborhoods. This
distribution reflects, in part, decades-old decisions on where to locate public housing, as
well as the success of locally organized opposition in the wealthier neighborhoods.
For example, only a few public housing developments were constructed in Queens, a
largely middle-class residential area. And there, the largest cluster of public housing is on
the Rockaway peninsula, on the ocean side of Kennedy Airport, an area that is geographically much closer to eastern Brooklyn than to the center of Queens. Staten Island, with its
network of predominantly working-class white residential neighborhoods, has only 10
public housing developments. These are concentrated in the borough’s densely populated
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Figure 2:
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Public housing sites by 2007 poverty rate in surrounding neighborhoods.

North Shore, near the ferry terminal that connects the island to Manhattan, and at some
distance from the single-home residences in the hilly wooded neighborhoods on the
island’s interior.
In Manhattan, most developments are located above 110th Street or below midtown
on the Lower East Side, well removed from the borough’s wealthiest neighborhoods and
commercial centers. Brooklyn has the most public housing in the city, with the largest
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Table 1:

Descriptive Statistics
Public Housing

Stop Rates*
Total
Trespass
Violence
Weapons
Drugs
Arrest Rates*
Total
Trespass
Violence
Weapons
Drugs
Enforcement Rates*
Total
Trespass
Violence
Weapons
Drugs
Crime Rates*
Total
Trespass
Violence
Weapons
Drugs
Demographics
White (%)
Black (%)
Hispanic (%)
Other (%)
Minors (%)
Household size
Per-capita income
Population

Surrounding Areas

Rest of City

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

150.0
47.9
18.2
44.4
18.7

178.1
67.8
33.2
57.1
23.4

131.2
19.7
23.1
43.8
15.6

160.9
29.3
31.6
67.3
16.8

82.7
3.0
13.9
14.0
6.4

445.4
14.0
58.3
110.8
34.4

78.5
12.2
10.1
3.7
29.8

97.6
21.4
13.7
5.4
43.0

86.3
5.8
13.2
3.5
27.9

85.8
5.8
16.9
3.0
27.2

76.1
2.1
10.9
2.4
14.0

473.1
13.3
55.5
12.9
58.3

228.5
60.1
28.2
48.1
48.6

256.0
80.5
39.4
60.8
61.1

217.5
25.4
36.3
47.4
43.5

236.5
32.8
40.6
69.8
41.9

158.7
5.1
24.8
16.4
20.4

881.6
23.8
101.0
119.4
87.0

94.0
4.3
20.7
3.3
14.3

93.7
10.5
19.9
4.5
22.3

102.8
2.0
22.6
3.0
10.9

64.2
2.6
15.4
2.5
10.3

115.0
0.7
17.7
2.0
5.0

807.4
3.3
80.6
11.3
28.8

5.8
46.9
42.4
5.0
27.3
2.2
20,654
1,499

10.3
19.8
17.4
8.4
11.7
0.6
4,098
1,446

19.8
34.5
36.3
9.7
25.2
3.0
20,776
7,940

24.1
26.0
22.6
14.0
8.5
0.7
17,948
4,562

40.5
20.7
24.1
14.7
21.8
2.9
31,884
1,422

34.0
30.5
24.9
17.5
10.0
1.2
27,327
1,066

*Per 1,000 population.
Source: 2007 ESRI and American Community Survey, Block Group Projection, 2007–2009.

concentrations in the heavily minority neighborhoods of Brownsville, Bushwick, and East
New York. Particularly for the larger developments in the “outer boroughs,” such as
Queensbridge, Morrisania, or Brownsville, public housing tends to ecologically dominate
the surrounding areas, suggesting that some areas are “public housing neighborhoods.”
These also are the neighborhoods with the most intensive police surveillance and highest
rates of Terry stops per felony crime and per-capita population.
Table 1 shows the concentrated disadvantage of both public housing developments
and their surrounding neighborhoods compared to the rest of the city. Public housing and
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the surrounding areas have comparable but lower per-capita incomes compared to the rest
of the city. NYCHA’s eligibility criteria for public housing narrow the range of incomes in
public housing, but there is a large range in incomes in the surrounding areas. There are
higher concentrations of nonwhites and higher concentrations of children and adolescents
in public housing.
Despite their structural similarities, crime rates in public housing are slightly lower
than in the surrounding neighborhoods, perhaps owing to the siting of public housing in
the city’s poorest places. However, drug crime rates, one of the rationales for intensive
enforcement in public housing, are in fact higher there than in the surrounding areas.
However, enforcement in public housing is consistently higher than in the surrounding
areas or elsewhere in the city. Assuming that enforcement is distributed proportionately
(though not necessarily monotonically) with crime, the enforcement differentials are far
greater than would be predicted by the narrow crime rate differences with the surrounding
areas. The large standard deviations in the crime rates in public housing suggest that there
is quite a bit of variation in these rates across developments, far more variation than in the
surrounding areas.

B. Trespass Enforcement in Public Housing
1. Relative Incidence of Trespass Enforcement
Figure 3 shows trends over time in the ratio of trespass stops to total crime complaints in
public housing and the surrounding areas. At first glance, using crime as a benchmark, the
lines show that relative to local crime conditions, the rate of Terry stops per crime is far
greater in public housing than in similarly situated surrounding areas. One might expect
that the policy mandate to link enforcement to crime (Maple & Mitchell 2000; Bratton &
Knobler 1998) would lead to similar ratios but here the lines diverge, suggesting that there
is additional attention to crime in public housing. It is this marginal enforcement that
animates the analyses to identify the specific role of public housing relative to other social
and crime conditions.
Tables 2–5 present results for three different types of trespass enforcement
(stops, arrests, and overall enforcement) for four different crime exposures (weapons
crimes, drug crimes, violent crimes, and total crimes). In each model, the extent
of trespass enforcement—for all three measures—is significantly greater in public
housing than in the surrounding areas, controlling for policing (vertical patrols and
patrol strength), crime (lagged), and local social and economic conditions (SES factor
and population). Moreover, the size of the coefficients for public housing is fairly
large.
Other trends are noteworthy in these models. The SES factor is a significant predictor of enforcement in only five of the 12 models, and then only for total and drug
crime exposures. This suggests that factors other than the social composition of these sites
are driving enforcement rates, including perhaps race. The measures of policing strategy
influence these outcomes. Patrol strength and vertical patrols both are significant predictors of each measure of enforcement and across crime types. Since both measures are

714

Fagan et al.

Figure 3: Ratio of trespass stops to total crime in public housing and surrounding areas,
2004–2011.
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Table 2: Negative Binomial Regressions of Trespass Enforcement by Public Housing,
Policing, Socioeconomic Conditions, and Weapons Offenses, NYCHA Sites and
Surrounding Areas, 2004–2011
Trespass Enforcement
Stops
Weapons Offenses
Public housing
SES factor
Population (logged)
Vertical patrols
Patrol strength
Constant
Log-likelihood
AIC

b

SE

0.890
0.038
0.009
0.041
0.067
0.015
0.001
<0.001
0.001
<0.001
-0.829
0.121
-148,459.10
296,936.19

Arrests
p

b

***

0.776
0.042
0.147
0.001
-0.002
-1.312

***
***
*
***

SE
0.026
0.040
0.015
<0.001
<0.001
0.170
-98,883.33
197,784.66

Overall Enforcement
p
***
***
**
***
***

b

SE

0.818
0.030
0.020
0.040
0.087
0.013
0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
-0.804
0.104
-163,978.84
327,975.69

p
***
***
***
***

***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.

sensitive to the built environment—that is, vertical patrols are more likely to be conducted
in multistory residential buildings—the concentration of trespass enforcement in public
housing is evident after controlling for other factors that might explain police activity in
those areas compared to its immediate environs. But the effect sizes here are small,
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Table 3: Negative Binomial Regressions of Trespass Enforcement by Public Housing,
Policing, Socioeconomic Conditions, and Drug Offenses, NYCHA Sites and Surrounding
Areas, 2004–2011
Trespass Enforcement
Stops
Drug Offenses
Public housing
SES factor
Population (logged)
Vertical patrols
Patrol strength
Constant
Log-likelihood
AIC

b

SE

0.836
0.049
-0.071
0.028
-0.023
0.026
0.001
<0.001
0.002
<0.001
-1.177
0.190
-139,342.44
278,702.88

Arrests
p

b

***
***
***
***
***
***

0.683
-0.023
0.073
0.001
<0.001
-1.651

Overall Enforcement

SE

p

0.046
0.029
0.029
<0.001
<0.001
0.267
-89,624.92
179,267.83

***
**
***
***

SE

b

p

0.768
0.043
-0.055
0.027
-0.001
0.025
0.001
<0.001
0.002
0.001
-1.092
0.179
-152,894.80
305,807.59

***
**
***
***
***

***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.

Table 4: Negative Binomial Regressions of Trespass Enforcement by Public Housing,
Policing, Socioeconomic Conditions, and Violent Offenses, NYCHA Sites and Surrounding
Areas, 2004–2011
Trespass Enforcement
Stops
Violent Offenses
Public housing
SES factor
Population (logged)
Vertical patrols
Patrol strength
Constant
Log-likelihood
AIC

b

SE

1.159
0.050
0.020
0.031
-0.100
0.020
0.001
<0.001
0.004
<0.001
-1.456
0.194
-129,053.36
258,124.73

Arrests
p

b

***

0.948
0.051
-0.029
0.001
0.001
-1.824

***
***
***
***

SE
0.071
0.038
0.033
<0.001
<0.001
0.310
-84,861.04
169,740.09

Overall Enforcement
p
***

***
***
***

b

SE

1.115
0.052
0.029
0.032
-0.069
0.018
0.001
<0.001
0.003
<0.001
-1.470
0.172
-142,075.33
284,168.67

p
***
***
***
***
***

***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.

suggesting that the differences in enforcement rates are in turn small but statistically
significant.5

5

These two measures of enforcement are, as might be expected, correlated at 0.569. This is a moderate effect, but not
large enough to raise concerns over multicollinearity in the models. Just to check, the models were run using only
patrol strength first, and then only with vertical patrols. The results for the public housing variable were
substantively unchanged.
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Table 5: Negative Binomial Regressions of Trespass Enforcement by Public Housing,
Policing, Socioeconomic Conditions, and Total Offenses, NYCHA Sites and Surrounding
Areas, 2004–2011
Trespass Enforcement
Stops
Total Offenses
Public housing
SES factor
Population (logged)
Vertical patrols
Patrol strength
Constant
Log-likelihood
AIC

b

SE

1.328
0.059
0.093
0.034
-0.092
0.021
0.001
<0.001
0.004
<0.001
-2.904
0.205
-121,637.10
243,292.20

Arrests
p

b

SE

***
***
***
***
***
***

1.086
0.128
-0.017
0.001
0.002
-3.277

0.068
0.039
0.035
<0.001
<0.001
0.310
-79,272.89
158,563.77

Overall Enforcement
p

b

***
***

1.295
0.106
-0.056
0.001
0.004
-2.906

***
***
***

SE
0.058
0.034
0.018
<0.001
<0.001
.0173
-132,995.27
266,008.54

p
***
***
***
***
***
***

***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.

Table 6: Incidence Rate Ratios for Trespass Enforcement in Public Housing Versus Surrounding Area,
Controlling for Policing, Crime, and Socioeconomic
Conditions, 2004–2011
Trespass Enforcement
Crime Rate

Stops

Arrests

Overall

Weapons offenses
Drug offenses
Violent crimes
Total crime

2.434
2.307
3.186
3.772

2.172
1.981
2.581
2.963

2.266
2.155
3.049
3.650

*All coefficients are significant at p < 0.001.

Table 6 shows the extent of those disparities by converting the parameter estimates
for public housing presented in Tables 2–5 to incidence rate ratios, or IRRs.6 In a negative binomial regression, the IRR is a measure of the rate of change in a dependent
variable for every unit increase in a predictor (Hilbe 2007; Hoffman et al. 2008). In these
models, the IRR is the increase in enforcement per crime (the exposure variable) for
each measure of trespass enforcement for the public housing sites compared to the surrounding area.
For each test, the rate of stops and arrests per crime in public housing compared to
the surrounding areas is at least twice as high compared to the count of stops in the

6
For example, in Table 2 the coefficient for public housing under the “Stops” model is 0.890. In Table 6, the value
of 0.890 converted to an IRR is 2.434.
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Table 7: Incidence Rate Ratios for Total Enforcement
in Public Housing Versus Surrounding Area, Controlling for Policing, Crime, and Socioeconomic Conditions, 2004–2011
Total Enforcement
Crime Rate
Weapons offenses
Drug offenses
Violent crimes
Total crime

Stops
1.348
2.307
1.516
1.761

Arrests
***
***
***
***

0.908
0.683
0.873
0.963

***
***
***
ns

Overall
1.141
0.932
1.251
1.448

***
ns
***
***

***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.

surrounding areas, even after controlling for the predictors in the regression equations.
The IRRs vary from 2.000 to 3.716. These are large effects, especially considering the extent
to which the estimates are adjusted for plausible simultaneous (policing) and lagged
(crime) effects. This evidence points to targeting of public housing for trespass enforcement, consistent with a disparate treatment framework.
2. Extension to Total Enforcement
The analyses in Tables 2–5 were repeated with total enforcement as the outcome or
dependent variables: that is, instead of trespass stops, trespass arrests, and overall trespass
enforcement, we used total stops, total arrests, and overall total enforcement (the sum of
total stops and total arrests). Since trespass enforcement in public housing is only one of
several types of enforcement in those locales, these analyses examine whether the disparities between public housing and its surrounding areas are present for a broader range of
police enforcement activities. Table 7 shows the IRR estimates for the public housing
variable.7
The effects for public housing that were observed for trespass enforcement are still
present, but slightly less consistently. Public housing status is significant and positive in
seven of the 12 models, it is not significant in two of the 12 models, and it is negative and
significant in three others. For total stops, the public housing effect is positive and significant for all four models. This suggests that there are significantly more stops in public
housing, across four different crime exposure measures, after controlling for each of the
crime-specific measures and three measures of police deployment. For models of overall
enforcement (i.e., stops plus arrests), public housing is significant in three of the four
models. The only nonsignificant effect of public housing on total enforcement is in the
model with drug offenses as the exposure measure.
Overall, for both stops and overall total enforcement, there is strong and consistent
evidence of greater levels of general enforcement in public housing. The differences

7

Full model results are available from the authors.
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between public housing and surrounding areas are not as large for total enforcement
compared to trespass enforcement, but still large and—for stops and overall total
enforcement—positive and significant. These results reflect the special emphasis on trespass enforcement in public housing. But trespass stops in public housing are still only a
share—less than half—of the total amount of stops in public housing. The models in this
section suggest that for stops and for overall total enforcement, these disparities are present
in the totality of enforcement activities by NYPD officers. The robustness of these results to
different crime exposure conditions and policing effects suggests the importance of public
housing as a “hot spot” of trespass and other enforcement, net of any differences in local
crime rates or other social factors.
Arrests, however, suggest fewer differences and, in some cases, a reverse effect. The
public housing effect is negative and significant in three of the four models, and not
significant in the fourth model. In other words, relative to the rates of violent, drug, and
weapons offenses in public housing, there were significantly more arrests in the surrounding areas. However, there were more stops in public housing relative to these crimes, so the
results suggest a pattern of unproductive stops relative to these two categories of crime.
C. Decomposing by Race
Tables 8–11 show results of tests for racial disparities in trespass and other enforcement
domains in public housing. The regressions test for racial disparities in four types of
Table 8: Linear Mixed Effects Regressions of Differences in Trespass Enforcement
Between Public Housing and Surrounding Area, by Racial Composition, Policing, and
Socioeconomic Conditions, 2004–2011a
Trespass Enforcement
Stops
Difference
% Black
% Hispanic
% Other race
Drug crimesb
Weapons crimesb
% Minors
Household size
Income per capita (logged)
Total population (logged)
Vertical patrolsc
Patrol strengthc
Constant
Log-likelihood
AIC
a

b

SE

0.457
0.268
0.899
0.270
1.785
0.446
0.035
0.006
0.006
0.007
0.001
0.004
-0.012
0.066
-0.066
0.057
0.235
0.039
0.146
0.006
0.404
0.006
0.650
0.149
-40,896.34
82,010.68

All models estimated with fixed effects for months.
Logged, lagged one month.
c
Rate per household, logged.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
b

Arrests
p
*
***
***
***

***
***
***
***

b

SE

1.152
0.266
0.755
0.268
1.026
0.442
0.080
0.006
0.009
0.008
0.002
0.004
-0.044
0.066
0.003
0.056
0.223
0.039
0.086
0.007
0.107
0.007
0.372
0.149
-41,521.88
83,261.76

Overall Enforcement
p
***
***
**
***
***

***
***
***
**

b

SE

1.027
0.292
1.102
0.293
2.076
0.486
0.058
0.006
0.005
0.007
0.006
0.004
-0.069
0.072
-0.015
0.063
0.285
0.043
0.149
0.007
0.377
0.007
0.568
0.160
-41,185.18
82,588.37

p
***
***
***
***

***
***
***
***
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Table 9: Linear Mixed Effects Regressions of Differences in Drug Enforcement Between
Public Housing and Surrounding Area, by Racial Composition, Policing, and Socioeconomic Conditions, 2004–2011a
Drug Enforcement
Stops
Difference
% Black
% Hispanic
% Other race
Drug crimesb
Weapons crimesb
% Minors
Household size
Income per capita (logged)
Total population (logged)
Vertical patrolsc
Patrol strengthc
Constant
Log-likelihood
AIC

b

SE

0.811
0.214
1.126
0.217
0.823
0.353
0.048
0.006
0.009
0.008
-0.009
0.003
0.020
0.053
0.022
0.044
0.130
0.031
0.058
0.007
0.381
0.007
-0.100
0.129
-42,145.02
84,508.04

Arrests
p
***
***
**
***
***

***
***
***

b

SE

1.617
0.326
0.406
0.327
0.697
0.543
0.085
0.007
0.041
0.008
0.005
0.005
0.051
0.081
0.039
0.071
0.084
0.048
0.026
0.007
0.120
0.007
-0.665
0.177
-43,216.46
86,650.93

Overall Enforcement
p
***

***
***

*
***
***
***

b

SE

1.618
0.296
0.784
0.297
0.883
0.492
0.078
0.007
0.031
0.008
<0.001
0.004
0.063
0.073
0.091
0.064
0.116
0.043
0.042
0.007
0.300
0.007
-0.459
0.163
-42,598.81
85,415.62

p
***
***
*
***
***

***
***
***
***

a

All models estimated with fixed effects for months.
Logged, lagged one month.
c
Rate per household, logged.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
b

enforcement: trespass, drugs, weapons, and total enforcement rates. Within each table,
results are shown for separate regressions for stops, arrests, and total enforcement. The
models control for three sets of factors that may also influence the disparities in stops:
dosages of policing (vertical patrols and patrol strength), two dimensions of crime (drug
offenses and weapons offenses lagged by one month), and the social and economic conditions in each place. The drugs and weapons offense categories were chosen because of
their salience both in contemporary and historic enforcement rationales for the special and
intensive treatment of public housing (Fagan et al. 2006). Again, these are differences, and
the interpretation—as with the racial and ethnic variables—is that a positive difference in
the predictor predicts a positive difference in stops.
Table 8 shows the results of three models on trespass enforcement: stops, arrests,
and overall (stops plus arrests) enforcement. The first vertical panel shows the results for
trespass stops. For both percent black and percent Hispanic, the difference in population
between public housing sites and the surrounding areas is a significant predictor of the
difference in trespass stops between those two places. The relationship is positive, as
indicated by the finding in Table 2, in that there are more trespass stops in public
housing.
The pattern of results in the trespass stop model in Table 8 is repeated in the second
and third vertical panels that show regression results for trespass arrests and for overall
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Table 10: Linear Mixed Effects Regressions of Differences in Weapons Enforcement
Between Public Housing and Surrounding Area, by Racial Composition, Policing, and
Socioeconomic Conditions, 2004–2011a
Weapons Enforcement
Stops
Difference
% Black
% Hispanic
% Other race
Drug crimesb
Weapons crimesb
% Minors
Household size
Income per capita (logged)
Total population (logged)
Vertical patrolsc
Patrol strengthc
Constant
Log-likelihood
AIC

b

SE

1.076
0.193
0.999
0.196
0.899
0.320
0.026
0.006
0.016
0.007
-0.001
0.003
-0.035
0.048
-0.044
0.040
0.101
0.028
0.032
0.006
0.580
0.006
-0.473
0.116
-38,921.74
78,061.49

Arrests
p
***
***
***
***
**
***

***
***
***
***

b

SE

0.980
0.153
0.829
0.156
0.732
0.252
0.044
0.006
0.039
0.007
0.004
0.002
-0.085
0.038
-0.014
0.031
0.016
0.022
0.017
0.005
0.065
0.006
-0.513
0.100
-38,447.03
77,112.07

Overall Enforcement
p
***

***
***

*
***
***
***

b

SE

1.109
0.195
0.976
0.198
0.970
0.323
0.035
0.006
0.020
0.007
0.001
0.003
-0.056
0.048
-0.034
0.040
0.103
0.028
0.033
0.006
0.560
0.006
-0.521
0.117
-38,230.67
78,679.34

p
***
***
*
***
***

***
***
***
***

a

All models estimated with fixed effects for months.
Logged, lagged one month.
c
Rate per household, logged.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
b

trespass enforcement. Differences in racial composition for both percent black and percent
Hispanic predict differences in trespass arrests, controlling for crime, policing, and socioeconomic conditions. The greater amounts of policing—vertical patrols and patrol
strength—in public housing also predict differences in trespass enforcement. But note also
that the racial differences are observed as additional significant influences even after
controlling for the relevance of crime and policing.
Tables 9–11 repeat these analyses for three other dimensions of enforcement: drug
enforcement, weapons enforcement, and total enforcement. The findings for the influence of racial composition on public housing are robust. The difference in percent black
is a significant predictor of the difference in all three measures of enforcement in eight
of the nine models in these three tables. The difference in percent Hispanic is a significant predictor in four of the nine models in these three tables. Overall, the difference in
percent Hispanic population is statistically significant in seven of the 12 models, including all three trespass models and two of the three models for the important category of
drug enforcement.
The consistency of the results across two different types of tests for disparate treatment suggests that, in fact, race and ethnicity play an important role in the conduct of
enforcement in public housing, a role that is present after controlling for other policyrelevant factors and social conditions, as well as for the allocation of police resources and
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Table 11: Linear Mixed Effects Regressions of Differences in Total Enforcement Between
Public Housing and Surrounding Area, by Racial Composition, Policing, and Socioeconomic Conditions, 2004–2011a
Total Enforcement
Stops
Difference
% Black
% Hispanic
% Other race
Drug crimesb
Weapons crimesb
% Minors
Household size
Income per capita (logged)
Total population (logged)
Vertical patrolsc
Patrol strengthc
Constant
Log-likelihood
AIC

b
0.044
0.056
0.188
0.005
-0.001
-0.001
0.022
-0.012
0.066
0.011
1.054
0.071

SE
0.052
0.053
0.087
0.001
0.002
0.001
0.013
0.011
0.008
0.001
0.001
0.030
-3,117.05
6,452.10

Arrests
p

**
***

***
***
***
**

b

SE

1.415
0.383
-0.046
0.381
0.239
0.630
0.059
0.006
0.035
0.007
0.002
0.005
0.085
0.096
0.108
0.089
0.047
0.057
0.042
0.007
0.142
0.006
-0.755
0.200
-40,325.80
80,869.59

Overall Enforcement
p
***

***
***

***
***
***

b

SE

1.036
0.267
-0.197
0.266
0.901
0.440
0.028
0.004
0.012
0.005
0.005
0.003
0.048
0.067
0.050
0.062
0.005
0.040
0.026
0.005
0.631
0.005
-0.337
0.140
-31,892.37
64,002.74

p
***
**
***
**

***
***
**

a

All models estimated with fixed effects for months.
Logged, lagged one month.
c
Rate per household, logged.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
b

the intensity of policing tactics. This comports with other analyses of the effects of the OMP
regime, and its heavy emphasis on stops and frisks. Blacks are stopped at far higher rates
than are Hispanics (Gelman et al. 2007; Fagan et al. 2010). They also are more likely to be
frisked once stopped, and arrested as well (Ridgeway 2007).
Still, these results have their limitations, and the limitations reflect the difficulty of
research in policing when comparing areas to detect possibly disparate treatment. Research
on public housing in particular faces considerable challenges in identifying a set of unconfounded and unbiased factors that can explain differences in how these places are regarded
by police relative to similarly situated places nearby. Beyond the difficulty of establishing or
approximating experimental conditions, crime and enforcement raise endogeneity concerns, and lagging crime or using first differences approaches are only partial solutions to
these problems (Manski & Nagin 1998). One can control for many concurrent and plausible explanations that may explain disparate treatment, and limit the uncertainty of
unobservables and estimators whose distributions are not fully known. That is the strategy
in this article. The challenge empirically is to move beyond a descriptive analysis to a
quasi-experimental design that exploits the proximity-neighbor function of the adjacent
block groups.
One way to do that is to uncover counterfactuals that might arbitrate between
competing explanations. Those are not readily available in this context. Given the
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persistently higher rates of violence and drug crimes in public housing, it is hard to
conclude—as one might in research on vehicle stops—that an equilibrium has been
reached between policing and crime, and that things might be even worse for public
housing residents should the police back off in trespass enforcement. Still, beyond the test
for discrimination in stops as an outcome, other tests such as drug or gun seizures might
well serve as a counterfactual to supplement the outcomes analysis and suggest other
benchmarks for this analysis. But the OMP regime in New York is remarkably inefficient in
producing either gun or drug seizures, or even limiting shootings. Seizure rates for drugs
are below 2 percent of all stops, and gun seizures at less than 1 percent of all stops (Fagan
et al. 2010). Even small effects would be difficult to detect and interpret given these low
base rates. Our results thus describe a pattern of bias in trespass and other enforcement,
and take measured steps toward eliminating the competing explanations.

V. Conclusion
Notwithstanding any advantages or disadvantages in public safety that may accrue from this
process over time, trespass enforcement seems to be structured into the fabric of public
housing, especially those places where black residents are the majority population group,
placing both its residents and visitors under a firm police gaze.
Distributive concerns predict that public housing residents would enjoy the benefits
of vertical patrol, and they would welcome the increased attention. In a contest between
de-policing and policing, policing usually wins. Even the much more intrusive searches
associated with Operation Clean Sweep in Chicago—during which systematic suspicionless
searches of residents’ apartment buildings were conducted—garnered a surprising
amount of community support (Yarosh 1992). Accordingly, we expect at least some
support from the community (Johnson 1989). Yet numbers matter too, and for residents,
especially those uninvolved in the drug trade, the frequency of vertical patrol is daunting.
Given that there are more than 25,000 vertical patrols per month in public housing in
New York, it is quite possible for a resident to be stopped and questioned multiple times
in the same week. In fact, Carlis (2009) cites recent survey data showing that 24 percent
of public housing residents surveyed reported being stopped more than 20 times in the
past year, and only about one in four (28 percent) reported no stops in the previous year.
According to the same survey, in the Thomas Jefferson Homes, 14.7 percent had been
arrested for trespass.
Public housing residents’ frustration is compounded by the fact that the patrols only
indirectly target the most serious crimes. The vast majority of arrests are for trespass, and
the connection to more serious crime is not apparent to residents (Carlis 2009). As a result
of the frequency of stops, their tangential relationship to serious criminal conduct, and
occasional mistreatment by NYPD officers, public housing residents are ambivalent about
the appropriateness and desirability of vertical patrols. In weighing the tradeoff between
liberty and security for public housing residents, the way vertical patrols are conducted
troubles residents.
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Vertical patrols regard residents and visitors alike as criminal suspects merely for
being present within their own apartment buildings. Their status of simply being in the
contested space of public housing exposes them and their friends and kin to legally
questionable stops and arrests. The racialization of this process compounds other racial
tensions that create legitimacy deficits that in turn complicate the project of police-citizen
cooperation in the pursuit of security. Policing in public housing has the potential to be
a transformative force, ensuring building residents feel safe and secure in their homes
and broadening the ties between citizens and police. It also has the potential to redistribute the benefits and burdens of patrol by seeking balance in how vertical patrol is
conducted. However, this process will have to reverse decades of cognitive bias about
public housing and its residents and policy entropy that seems to move only in one
direction.
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Appendix: Descriptions of Variables
Variable
Public housing
Stops
Total
Weapons
Trespass
Drugs
Arrests
Total
Weapons
Trespass
Drugs
Overall enforcement
Total
Weapons
Trespass
Drugs
Crime rates
Total
Weapons
Drugs
Violent
Policing
Vertical patrols

Patrol strength

Demography
SES factor

Total population
% black
% Hispanic
% white
% other race/ethnicity
% minors
Average household size
Per-capita income

Definition

Type

Table Reference

Indicator for public housing &
surrounding areas

Dichotomous (public
housing = 1)

All results tables

Total stops for all offenses
Stops for weapons offenses
Stops for trespass offenses
Stops for drug offenses

Count
Count
Count
Count

Tables 7 & 11
Table 10
Tables 2–6, 8
Table 9

Total arrests for all offenses
Arrests for weapons offenses
Arrests for trespass offenses
Arrests for drug offenses

Count
Count
Count
Count

Tables 7 & 11
Table 10
Tables 2–6, 8
Table 9

Total stops + Total arrests
Weapons stops + Weapons arrests
Trespass stops + Trespass arrests
Drug stops + Drug arrests

Summed
Summed
Summed
Summed

Total crime complaints

Count (logged
and lagged)
Count (logged
and lagged)
Count (logged
and lagged)
Count (logged
and lagged)

Tables 5–7

Number of vertical patrols reported
by police per unit of analysis,
year, month
Number of unique police officers
recording an arrest per unit of
analysis, year, month

Count

All results tables

Count

All results tables

PCA score comprised of: %
nonwhite, % minors, average
household size, and per-capita
income
Total population (logged)
% of population that is black
% of population that is Hispanic
% of population that is white
% of population that is other
race/ethnicity
% of population that is under 18
years old
Average household size
Per-capita income (logged)

Continuous

Tables 2–7

Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous

All results tables
Tables 8–11
Tables 8–11
Tables 8–11
Tables 8–11

Continuous

Tables 8–11

Continuous
Continuous

Tables 8–11
Tables 8–11

Crime complaints for weapons
offenses
Crime complaints for drug offenses
Crime complaints for violent
offenses

count
count
count
count

Tables 7 & 11
Table 10
Tables 2–6, 8
Table 9

Tables 2, 6–11
Tables 3, 6–11
Tables 4, 6 & 7

